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I. Introduction.
Ever since Alan Greenspan coined his now infamous phrase “irrational exhuberance”
there has been an increased amount of interest in whether or not central banks should respond to
asset prices.  Although his remarks and many subsequent discussions have focused on whether or
not central banks should “prick” asset price bubbles, more generally the question remains
whether and under what conditions should central banks respond to asset prices.  At the same
time there is a long history in monetary research dating to Friedman (1969) that optimal
monetary policy requires that the central bank simply set the nominal rate of interest to zero
independent of asset prices or any other shocks that might buffet the system.  This paper revisits
these questions and argues that the optimal rate of interest should not be zero precisely because
central bankers need the option of responding to external shocks – including asset prices.
Although this is an often-cited argument this paper derives this result in the context of a well-
specified general equilibrium model.
The starting point of the discussion is the Modigliani-Miller theorem.  The theorem
states that in a world with perfect capital markets a firm’s financial position (debt vs. equity
level) is irrelevant to its decisions on production and investment activities.  This separation
occurs because perfect capital markets allow information to flow easily.  If entrepreneur Emily
has a good idea for a new product, then the product will be produced irregardless of her personal
financial position because outside investors will see through her to the profit opportunity in the
good project, and provide any needed financing.
The Modiglani-Miller theorem is not necessarily meant to be a statement of reality.  In
fact, there is a voluminous empirical literature that provides evidence that financial position does
affect a firm’s ability to operate.  But the theorem provides an important benchmark and forces
one to think carefully about the workings of financial markets, and what imperfections are2
needed to create a world in which a firm’s financial position does affect its ability to engage in
production.
There are many possible imperfections that could generate such a world.  In this paper
we focus on an informational story.  Suppose that only Emily, the entrepreneur, knows the
intricate details of her proposed project.  If outside investors provide financing to Emily they
have no way of knowing for sure what she will do with their funds.  Furthermore, suppose that
they have limited ability to punish her after the fact if she runs off with their money, or squanders
the funds on a misguided production activity.  In such a scenario external investors will likely
provide financing only if they are sure they can recoup their investment if things turn sour.  One
way of ensuring this is to limit the size of their financing to Emily’s financial position.  That is,
external financing will be limited to the value of Emily’s collateral that can be seized after the
fact.
The previous outlines a story in which financial position, or what we will henceforth call
“collateral” or “net worth”, has a fundamental affect on a firm’s ability to engage in production.
This is not a Modigliani-Miller world.  What is the role of monetary policy in such a world?  Can
monetary policy help the economy respond to fundamental shocks buffeting the system?
This paper addresses these questions in a theoretical model.  To keep the analysis
tractable the model builds upon Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  The model is highly stylized, but
the essential point will survive more complicated modeling environments.  We purposely
structure the model so that in the absence of collateral constraints monetary policy is irrelevant.
That is, in the absence of collateral constraints, employment, consumption, and output are
entirely independent of the monetary regime.  But in a world with collateral constraints, short run
monetary policy suddenly becomes critical.  A key conclusion is that there is a role for activist
monetary policy: well-timed movements in the nominal rate of interest are welfare improving.3
The next Section lays out the basic model.  Section 3 then outlines the nature of optimal
monetary policy.  The final section links the paper to the existing literature.
II. The Model
The theoretical model consists of households and entrepreneurs.  We will discuss the
decision problems of each in turn.
Households:
Households are infinitely lived, discounting the future at rate β.  Their period-by-period
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where τ > 0, ct denotes consumption and Lt denotes work effort.   We choose this particular
functional form for convenience.  Each period the household chooses how much to work at a real
wage of wt, and how much to save. The only means of savings by households is in the form of
acquiring shares to a real asset that pays out dividends of Dt consumption goods at the end of
time-t.  It is helpful to think of this as an apple tree that produces Dt apples in time-t.  The
exogenous dividend process is given by
D
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The tree trades at share price qt at the beginning of the period (before the time-t dividend is paid).
We assume that shares must be purchased with cash accumulated in advance:
() t t t t t t B M D q f P − ≤ − (2)
where ft is the consumer’s tree purchases, qt is the real tree price, Pt is the nominal price level, Mt
is cash holdings at the beginning of the period, and Bt denotes bond purchases (these will be in
zero net supply).  We assume that shares must be purchased with cash because it is a simple4
mechanism by which monetary policy will have a direct effect on real asset prices.  There are
many other ways of generating this dependence, but this is the most transparent. Notice,
however, that cash is not needed to purchase the consumption good.  This point will be returned
to later.  Also for simplicity we assume that dividends are available within the period to purchase
new shares.  The household’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by
) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t D q f P f q P R B L w P c P M M − − + − + + − ≤ − + (3)
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on bond holdings.
The household’s first order conditions include:
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A few comments are in order.  First, labor supply (4) responds positively to the real wage with
elasticity τ.  Second, the Fisher equation (5) is “off” a period (Rt+1 is the gross nominal rate
between t+1 and t+2) because cash is required for financial market transactions but not for goods
market transactions.  Third, this cash constraint on financial transactions implies that movements
in the nominal rate of interest have a direct effect on real asset prices (6).  That is, to purchase a
tree requires holding cash-in-advance, and this has an opportunity cost of Rt.
Entrepreneurs:5
Entrepreneurs are also infinitely-lived, discounting the future at rate β, and have linear
preferences over consumption.  They are distinct from households in that they operate a constant
returns to scale production technology that uses labor to produce consumption goods:
t t t H A y = (7)
where At is the current level of productivity, and Ht denotes the number of workers employed at
real wage wt.  The productivity level At is an exogenous random process given by
A
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The entrepreneur is constrained by a borrowing limit.  In particular, the entrepreneur
must be able to cover his entire wage bill with collateral accumulated in advance.  We will
denote this collateral as nt for “net worth”.  The loan constraint is thus
t t t n H w ≤ .( 8 )
Why is the firm so constrained?  There are many possible informational stories that would
motivate such a constraint.  For example, suppose that the hired workers first supply their labor
input, but that output is subsequently produced if and only if the entrepreneur provides his
unique human capital to the process.  We now have a classic hold-up problem in which the
entrepreneur could force workers to accept lower wages ex post, for otherwise nothing will be
produced.  These problems can be entirely avoided if there is an existing stock of collateral that
the workers could simply seize in such a case.  Hence, to avoid these hold-up problems, workers
are willing to work if and only if the wage bill is entirely covered by existing collateral.
We can easily enrich this story by assuming that there exist financial institutions that
intermediate between workers and entrepreneurs.  For example, suppose that these intermediaries
provide within-period financing to entrepreneurs, and that this financing is used by firms to pay6
workers.  The intermediary, however, is concerned about the hold-up problem, and thus limits its
lending to the firm’s net worth.  Hence we once again have the collateral constraint (8).
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Notice that labor demand varies inversely (with a unit elasticity) to the real wage, but is
positively affected by the level of net worth.  Firms that have more collateral are able to employ
more workers because hold-up problems are less severe.  The binding collateral constraint
implies that At > wt, ie., the firm would like to hire more workers but is collateral-constrained.
Entrepreneurs’ sole source of net worth is previously acquired ownership of apple trees.
If we let et-1 denote the number of tree shares acquired at the beginning of time t-1, then time-t
net worth is given by
t t t q e n 1 − = (10)
so that the loan constraint is given by
t t t t q e H w 1 − ≤ (11)
As noted above, the assumption that the loan constraint is binding implies that the firm’s
marginal profits per worker employed is (At-wt).  These profits motivate the entrepreneur to
acquire more net worth.  We will need to limit this accumulation tendency so that collateral
remains relevant.  The entrepreneur’s budget constraint is given by
) ( 1 t t t t t t t t t
e
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Using the binding loan constraint, we can rewrite this as
t
t
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1 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) use a similar constraint.  See Hart and Moore (1994) for a discussion of the7
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Notice that the coefficient on nt exceeds 1/β.  Hence, because of the profit opportunities from net
worth (At > wt) and because the entrepreneur need not accumulate cash to purchase trees (Rt > 1),
the entrepreneur would like to accumulate trees until the constraint no longer binds.
2  To prevent
this from happening we will assume that entrepreneurs consume their dividends and a fraction of
their profits each period:
t
t
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We assume γ < 1 to offset the high return to internal funds and thus keep the entrepreneur
collateral constrained in equilibrium.  This assumption of imposing entrepreneurial consumption
is common to this literature: the two-period lives of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the “bruised
fruit” of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the constant consumption share of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (2000), or the higher discount rate of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
Equilibrium:
There are two markets in this theoretical model, the market for apple trees and the labor
market.  The respective market-clearing conditions are et + ft = 1, and Lt = Ht. The equilibrium
                                                                                                                                                                            
hold-up problem.
2 The assumption that entrepreneurs do not need cash to purchase trees is unimportant.  Even without this
cash-in-advance constraint the fact that At > wt implies that entrepreneurs will have an incentive to
accumulate net worth until their collateral constraint is no longer binding.8
tree price is given above by (6).  As for the labor market, equating labor supply to labor demand
and solving for the real wage and employment level yields
τ + = 1
1
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The equilibrium real wage and employment level is increasing in net worth because higher net
worth increases labor demand.  The labor supply curve is fixed and given by (4).
We will assume that monetary policy is given by directives for the gross nominal interest
rate Rt.  The implied path for the inflation rate comes from (5), while the supporting money
supply behavior can be backed out of the binding cash constraint.
Steady-state:
We can use the above to solve for the steady-state of the model.  Let π denote the steady-
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In what follows, it is important to note that monetary policy is superneutral with respect
to steady-state employment and output.  This is because we have assumed that cash is not needed
to facilitate consumption nor employment transactions.  Monetary policy does affect the steady-
state share price, but has no effect on steady-state net worth (n = eq) because the entrepreneur’s9
steady-state share holdings move inversely with the steady-state asset price.  This immediately
implies that there is no unique optimal long run nominal rate of interest.  In particular, there is no
presumption in favor of the Friedman rule of a zero nominal rate.
However, the informational frictions make the steady-state level of employment “too
low”.  If there were no collateral constraint, then real wages would be given by w = A, and
employment by L = A
τ.  But these levels are not achievable because of the presence of the
informational friction that manifests itself in the collateral constraint.  It is in this sense that the
size of γ proxies for the degree of agency costs within the model.
Log-Linearizing the Model.
Because monetary policy has no effect on steady-states, it is convenient to express the
equilibrium in terms of log-deviations.  Below the ~’s represent percent deviations from steady-
state:
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The tree price (6) can be expressed as
1















In summary, the model consists of equations (21)-(23).  There is one predetermined variable, et-1,
and three exogenous shocks: At, Dt, and Rt.11
Experiment 1: A Shock to Productivity (At).
Before turning to the question of monetary policy, it is useful to sharpen one’s economic
intuition about the model by considering several experiments.  For example, suppose monetary
policy is given by an interest rate peg ( t R
~
) and that we hold all other variables constant, and only
consider shocks to productivity.  Then we have









Notice that contemporaneous employment does not respond to shocks to productivity, At.  This is
a manifestation of the collateral constraint.  When productivity is high, the firm would like to
expand employment but is unable to do so because of the need to finance current activity with
current collateral.  Thus, the collateral constraint limits the ability of the firm to respond to
shocks.
There is, however, a delayed response.  A positive shock to At has no effect on current
employment, but raises et and thus tomorrow’s net worth.  Hence, employment responds with a
lag to shocks to productivity.
This lagged response generates persistence to a temporary productivity shock.  That is,
even if there is only a temporary one period shock to At, the effect on employment Lt and thus
output is much longer and only dies out at the rate given by τ/(1+τ).  If the shock to productivity
is serially correlated, this effect remains so that the collateral constraint causes a productivity
shock to have a more persistent effect
Experiment 2: A Shock to Dividends (Dt).








































































































t ε is the innovation in the dividend process. The most remarkable
observation is that employment responds positively to dividend shocks even though these
shocks have no effect on worker productivity nor on labor supply.  Instead, the effect of
dividends on employment comes entirely through the collateral constraint.  Because trees
are used as collateral, and a dividend shock drives up the price of trees, the collateral
constraint is relaxed and the firm is able to expand employment.  Once again these effects
are highly persistent.
III. Optimal Monetary Policy Under Commitment.
What is the optimal response of the nominal interest rate to productivity and dividend
shocks?  This section will answer this question in the case of commitment.  That is, we assume
that the central bank can credibly commit to an interest rate policy where by an interest rate
policy we mean a reaction function linking movements in the nominal interest rate to movements
in fundamental shocks buffeting the economy.13
The most natural choice for a welfare criterion is the sum of household and
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where the equality follows from the fact that total time-t consumption must equal the total supply
of time-t consumption goods.   This supply comes from those goods produced using the
entrepreneur’s production technology, and the dividends that are produced by the apple tree.  The
only choice variable in Vt is employment.  Maximizing Vt with respect to Lt yields the following
optimality condition
τ
t t A L = .
We will call this solution the “first best” outcome because the welfare criterion cannot be made
any higher.  Notice two natural features of the first best.  First, employment responds positively
to productivity shocks.  When productivity is high, it is efficient for employment to respond
positively.  Second, the first best employment does not respond to dividend or share prices.  The
welfare criterion Vt is increasing in Dt, but these shocks have no effect on labor productivity, and
thus it is efficient for employment to not respond to these shocks.
Is the first-best achievable?  If there was no collateral constraint, then we would have wt
= At and the first-best could be achieved with any monetary policy.
But in a world with agency costs, this first-best is not possible because employment is
given by (17), which, as noted above, is too low (At > wt) because of the collateral constraint,
Furthermore, according to (17), employment fluctuates with net worth and not with the level of
productivity.  Compared to the first-best outcome, these employment responses are dreadful:
contemporaneous employment does not respond to productivity even though it is efficient to do
so, but employment does respond to share prices which, in an efficient world, should have no14
effect on employment.  In short, the collateral constraint causes the economy to under respond to
productivity shocks, and to over respond to dividend shocks.
Can monetary policy improve on this economy’s ability to respond to shocks?  Yes.  To
illustrate this ability, let us consider a second best exercise.  Let λt < 1, denote how far
employment is from the first-best outcome in time-t:
τ λ t t t A L = . (25)
For example, consider an interest rate peg Rt = R > 1.  From above, we know that employment
does not respond to At but does respond to Dt.  This implies that λt is varying in such a way to
force employment to respond in this inefficient manner suggesting that welfare would be higher
with a stable λ.
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Notice that the productivity shock separates out, and that Vt is concave in λt.  This concavity
implies a preference for certainty:  Recall that monetary policy has no effect on the steady-state
level of employment.  Now consider two monetary policies, one of which stabilizes λt at some
constant λ, while the other policy has λt variable but with a mean of λ.
3  Because Vt is concave,
welfare is higher under the constant-λ policy.
What interest rate policy will stabilize λ at some constant as opposed to allowing it to
fluctuate around this constant?  This occurs when
t t A L
~ ~
τ = .
                                                          
3 The steady-state relationships imply that λ = γ.15
Imposing this on the system (21)-(23), we can then back out the implied interest rate policy.  This
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The latter implies that optimal policy keeps et at its initial level, which we will normalize to the
steady-state for simplicity.  With   0 ~ ~
1 = = − t t e e , we have t t q A ~ ~
) 1 ( = +τ , so that (23) can be
written as









) 1 ( ρ τ
β β






= + + ,






























There are several observations of interest.
First, when there is a positive shock to productivity At, the central bank should lower the
nominal interest rate so that employment can expand in an efficient manner.  A constant interest
rate policy does not allow this because of the collateral constraint.  This procyclical interest rate
policy overcomes the collateral constraint by making tree prices procyclical, and thus allows the
economy to respond appropriately.
Second, and in contrast, if there is a positive shock to dividends, the central bank should
increase the interest rate by enough to keep employment constant.  It is inefficient for
employment to respond to these dividend shocks, and the central bank can ensure no response by
raising the nominal rate in response.  In this case, the central bank increases the nominal rate by
enough to keep share prices at their initial level.16
Third, suppose that there is a common shock,  t t D A
~ ~
= .  Since τ > 0 and ρA < 1, optimal
interest rate policy remains procyclical with the nominal rate declining in response to a positive
productivity innovation.
Fourth, there is an obvious danger to a policy with very low average nominal interest
rates.  The optimal policy requires an ability to move the nominal rate adequately in response to
shocks.  As the average nominal rate approaches the zero bound, this flexibility is lost.  In the
model without the collateral constraint, there is no preference for the average inflation rate.  For
example, the Friedman rule of Rt = 1 is as good as any other. In this model with collateral
constraints, the Friedman rule would be disastrous as the central bank loses all ability to respond
in the way implied by (26).
Fifth, this optimal policy is not time consistent.  Within each period there is always an
incentive to drive the nominal rate down to zero, thus inflating asset prices, and allowing
employment to temporarily move closer to the first best.  This desire to deviate is eliminated only
at the Friedman rule of R = 1.  Thus, although the optimal policy under commitment calls for the
average nominal interest rate to be sufficiently positive, the time consistent policy is R = 1.
Hence, we have a novel form of the commitment problem.  The central bank would like to
commit to higher nominal interest rates than would arise in the model without commitment.
IV. Conclusions.
This paper addresses the question of whether monetary policy should respond to asset
prices.  We address this question in a stylized model in which asset prices have a direct effect on
real activity because of binding collateral constraints.  In this environment there is a welfare-
improving role for a monetary policy that will actively respond to asset price and productivity
shocks.  This activist interest rate policy allows the economy to respond to shocks in a Pareto
efficient manner.  By assumption, monetary policy cannot eliminate the long run impact of the17
informational constraint, but it can smooth the fluctuations in this constraint.  This smoothing is
welfare-improving.
In a related piece, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that monetary policy should not
respond directly to asset prices.
4  There are two key differences in the analyses.  First, Bernanke
and Gertler do not conduct an optimal policy exercise, but instead assume that the central bank is
following a Taylor-type policy rule in which the interest rate responds positively to inflation
shocks.  Within the confines of this rule, they ask whether or not there is a separate role for a
response to asset prices.  In contrast, the current paper deduces the nature of the optimal policy
rule.  A second key difference is that Bernanke and Gertler consider a model with sticky goods
prices, while the current paper considers a flexible price environment.  In their sticky price
model, asset price movements increase “aggregate demand” and directly increase current
inflation.
5  Hence, a Taylor rule that responds to inflation is also indirectly responding to share
prices, so that there may be no need for a direct response to share prices.  In this paper’s flexible
price environment asset price movements have no direct effect on inflation, so that this indirect
response to asset prices is precluded.
                                                          
4 Their theoretical environment builds on Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000).  See Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) for a related discussion.
5 In contrast, in the model of this paper, asset price movements increase “aggregate supply” by easing the
loan constraint upon firms.18
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